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8:45 a.m.        Welcome and Opening Remarks

                       

9:00 a.m.        Panel #1:  The Future of the Voting Rights Act

                        Moderator:  Prof. Mark Rush, W&L Department of Politics

                        Speakers:

§  Prof. Henry Chambers, Richmond Law

§  Prof. Travis Crum, Washington University in St. Louis Law

§  Prof. Josh Douglas, Kentucky Law

§  Mr. Caleb Jackson, Counsel, Sen. Laphonza Butler, Senate Judiciary Committee

                       
10:30 a.m.     Break

 

10:45 a.m.     Panel #2:  Current Issues in Election Administration and Voter Suppression

                        Moderator:  Prof. Maureen Edobor, W&L Law

                        Speakers:

§  Prof. Rebecca Green, William & Mary Law

§  Prof. Spencer Overton, GW Law

§  Prof. Bertrall Ross, UVA Law

§  Prof. Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, Stetson Law

 

12:15 p.m.     Lunch Break

           

1:15 p.m.       Keynote Address

Location:  Moot Court Room

Speaker:  Mr. Deuel Ross, Deputy Director of Litigation, NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.

 

2:00 p.m.       Panel #3:  Litigating Voting Rights

                        Moderator:  Prof. Chris Seaman, W&L Law

                        Speakers:

§  Prof. Ruth Greenwood, Director, Election Law Clinic, Harvard Law

§  Mr. Ernest Herrera, Western Regional Counsel, Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund

§  Ms. Danielle Lang, Senior Director, Voting Rights, Campaign Legal Center

§  Ms. Terry Ao Minnis, Vice President of Census and Voting Programs, Asian Americans Advancing Justice

 

3:30 p.m.       Break

 

3:45 p.m.       Panel #4:  Remedies in Election Law

                        Moderator:  Prof. Alan Trammell, W&L Law

                        Speakers:

§  Prof. Wilfred Codrington III, Brooklyn Law

§  Prof. Michael Morley, Florida State Law

§  Ms. Jessica Matsuda, Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP

§  Prof. Nick Stephanopoulos, Harvard Law

                       

5:15 p.m.       Closing Remarks

                        Scott Koven, Editor-in-Chief, Washington and Lee Law Review

                        Prof. Chris Seaman and Prof. Maureen Edobor, Faculty Sponsors

The Lara D. Gass Symposium is named in honor of Lara Gass, a member of the Law Class of 2014 who passed away in an automobile accident in March of 2014. Gass served as Symposium Editor for the Washington and Lee Law Review, organizing the Law Review’s 2014 symposium focused on the 40th anniversary of Roe v. Wade. Lara was active within the Women Law Students Organization and also served as a Kirgis Fellow, the law school’s peer mentoring group, during the 2012–21013 academic year. In January 2014, Lara received recognition for her academic achievements, her leadership abilities, her service to the law school and university community, and her character when she was inducted into Omicron Delta Kappa, the National Leadership Honor Society.

Development

by Rep. Eric M. Swalwell & R. Kyle Alagood

A national security strategy is the “nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well as military—to pursue objectives that defend and advance its national interest.” Perhaps the most straightforward national security objective is to protect the country from foreign invasion, but national security involves other objectives that aim to protect people in the United States as well as their values. For example, protecting U.S. elections from foreign interference is a security objective that advances the nation’s interest in democratic governance. The outbreak of a highly contagious disease like COVID‑19 strikes at the core of national security and the nation’s interest in protecting its citizens from unnecessary harm.

Note

by Emily K. Dalessio

In its 2019 decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, the Supreme Court closed the doors of the federal courts to litigants claiming a violation of their constitutional rights based on partisan gerrymandering. In Rucho, the Court held that partisan gerrymandering presents a political question that falls outside the jurisdiction of the federal courts. However, the Supreme Court did not address an insidious consequence of this ruling: namely, that map-drawers may use partisan rationales to obscure what is otherwise an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. This Note uses North Carolina as an example of a state with a long history of gerrymandering—both racial and partisan. Over the course of the last quarter century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly struck down North Carolina’s redistricting efforts as the product of racial gerrymandering. Nonetheless, when the State changed its strategy, arguing that it based its redistricting efforts on partisan goals, the Supreme Court in Rucho ultimately declined to review the constitutionality of the map, allowing it to stand. This leaves voters potentially unable to challenge redistricting where, as is the case in North Carolina, race and political behavior are closely aligned and the map-drawers claim that the map was designed to secure partisan advantage, even if racial demographics were central to their considerations. In effect, Rucho creates a “magic words” test that incentivizes map-drawers to sanitize the legislative record of references to race, in favor of references to partisanship, in order to insulate redistricting plans from federal judicial review.

This Note suggests that the Supreme Court adopt a test to distinguish between racial and partisan gerrymandering using the approach the Court took in Flowers v. Mississippi—another 2019 decision. In Flowers, the Court placed great emphasis on Mississippi’s history of racial discrimination in jury selection in finding that the State had again violated the Equal Protection Clause in the case before it. Applying that logic to the issue of gerrymandering, this Note proposes a test that would presume that a challenged map from a state with a history of racial gerrymandering was a product of racial gerrymandering. The State would then face a high burden to rebut that presumption before the reviewing court could decide whether the case presents a political question under Rucho. The test this Note proposes would safeguard the right to vote, especially for Black and minority voters in states with histories of voter suppression and in so doing, ensure that the fundamentals of the democratic process are not subject to further erosion.

Note

by Lara M. McMahon

This Note proposes four factors courts should consider when asked to determine whether law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constituted a Fourth Amendment search. The first asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance infringed on a constitutionally protected area, such as the home. The second asks courts to consider the duration of the cell-site simulator surveillance. The third asks courts to consider whether the cell-site simulator surveillance was conducted actively or passively. The fourth asks courts to focus on the nature and depth of the information obtained as a result of the cell-site simulator surveillance. If, after analyzing these four factors, a court concludes that law enforcement officers conducted a Fourth Amendment search, the court must then ask whether the search was reasonable. Cell-site simulators are generally used in the “enterprise of ferreting out crime.” Thus, if law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator amounts to a Fourth Amendment search, that search should be considered unreasonable, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment, if it was conducted without a warrant.

The Note also provides background information regarding the development and use of cell-site simulators at the federal, state, and local levels. Part II lays out a general framework for analyzing Fourth Amendment search and seizure cases. Part II.A concludes that law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator does not constitute a Fourth Amendment seizure, but Part II.B argues that it may constitute a Fourth Amendment search. Part II.B then delves into Fourth Amendment search case law, chronicling several key Supreme Court decisions that apply both the traditional, physical trespass test and the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test to various electronic surveillance techniques. Part II.B next analyzes the three cell-site simulator cases referenced earlier in this Part—Maryland v. AndrewsUnited States v. Lambis, and Jones v. United States—and concludes that the courts in Andrews and Jones (D.C.) came to overly broad conclusions in holding that law enforcement’s use of cell-site simulators categorically violates individuals’ expectations of privacy. Part III proposes four factors courts should consider to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis, law enforcement’s use of a cell-site simulator constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. Part IV addresses the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement and concludes that the warrant preference model for determining reasonableness is best-suited to cell-site simulators.

Article

by Wynter K. Miller & Benjamin E. Berkman

Under the First Amendment, state intervention in conversations between physicians and prospective parents about prenatal whole genome sequencing (PWGS) should trigger at least heightened scrutiny. Part I of this Article provides an overview of the most recent advances in genetic testing. It assesses the ongoing impact of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) for providers and patients and charts the course from NIPT to PWGS. Part II establishes a foundational background for evaluating First Amendment claims. Part II.A describes the development of First Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the doctrinal distinctions between levels of judicial scrutiny. Part II.B explores historical Supreme Court case law addressing professional speech. Part III surveys the current legal landscape. Using a handful of recent Circuit cases, Part III.A demonstrates that the legal frameworks for assessing physician speech qua professional speech are shambolic. Part III.B provides an overview of the most recent Supreme Court ruling on professional speech in the 2018 case National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra. Part IV uses the material in Parts I–III to predict how legislative efforts to limit reproductive decision-making are likely to manifest in the PWGS context. Based on the case analyses in Part III, Part IV identifies the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit approaches as the most defensible for future judicial interventions. This Article concludes that state-based restrictions on PWGS-related speech would be vulnerable to First Amendment challenges and unlikely to survive heightened judicial scrutiny.

Response

by Marc Edelman

In recent years, two law review articles have proposed that the United States regulate commercial sports through a direct federal commission, rather than through traditional antitrust remedies. Nevertheless, the practical realities of commercial sports’ power to influence government policy offset the many theoretical advantages to creating a specialized regulatory body to oversee commercial sports. The commercial sports industry already possesses an extraordinarily strong lobbying arm that has successfully lobbied for special legislation, such as the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961 and the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992. If commercial sports ever were to become administratively regulated, sports leagues would likely be able to use their lobbying power to obtain even greater concessions under U.S. law. Consequently, this Article argues that, albeit imperfect, antitrust law remains the most practical way to regulate commercial sports leagues.

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