Since the 1950’s, scientists have built novel technologies to screen for genetic diseases and other biological irregularities. Recently, researchers have developed a method called “liquid biopsy” (as opposed to a standard tissue biopsy) that uses a liquid sample (e.g., blood) to non‑invasively spot biomarkers indicating different types of cancers in the patient’s body. While the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has fully cleared a small number of liquid biopsy tests under its rigorous and expensive review process, most biotech companies have instead followed a less restrictive regulatory path through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which label the devices as “laboratory-developed tests” (LDTs).

Despite Congress’ initial passage of LDT designation in the 1980’s, LDT regulation remains akin to the “Wild West,” with ongoing questions about which agency is actually in charge of LDTs. While FDA initially claimed regulatory control over LDTs, it has (until recently) left discretion to CMS. Therefore, some unscrupulous companies have tried to abuse the gray regulatory area by marketing potentially misleading scientific claims about their LDTs, comparing them to FDA‑approved tests. Competitors with fully‑approved tests are furious and have sued under federal Lanham Act claims. Because of Congress’ repeated failures to pass a law addressing these claims and modernize the regulatory path for all in-vitro diagnostic tests, the FDA has proposed its own rules amending its regulatory authority to reign in most diagnostic tests.

This Note therefore suggests a multi-faceted approach to address the issue of regulating LDTs and their potentially misleading claims by (1) revising failed Congressional bills to allow regulatory and industry compromise, (2) applying certain circuit court decisions on Lanham Act claims to questionable facts in a company’s advertisements, and (3) narrowly expand the FDA’s regulatory power to all liquid biopsy tests before gradually expanding to all LDTs. Although LDTs may benefit the healthcare sector by offering novel tools to identify rare diseases, the federal government must develop an approach that both protects private parties and the general public and balances the need for research and development of life‑saving diagnostic tests.

Across the United States, a countless number of people rely on groundwater for basic necessities such as eating, drinking, agriculture, and energy-creation. At the same time, overuse combined with increasingly dry conditions throughout the country, tied to the increasingly unpredictable and devastating impacts of climate change, threaten this fundamental building block of society. Nowhere is this problem more pernicious than the American Southwest. The Colorado River Basin has always been the epicenter of water disputes between communities and states. Bad policies, unhelpful federal actions, and sluggish Supreme Court decisions stop the painful but necessary steps to address the increasingly dire water shortage. At the center of this crisis are two opposing camps that stand to gain or lose much. California, with the weight of history is on one side, while Arizona and Nevada, often disadvantaged, occupy the other. Yet these underdog states may have a way to escape the unjust outcomes that have hounded them to this point. If Arizona and Nevada choose, recent Supreme Court decisions provide the ammunition needed to finally create a fair and equitable distribution of water in the Southwest, and break California’s oppressive control over the lion’s share of Colorado River Basin water.

Municipalities have been trying for decades to hold energy companies accountable for their role in the climate change crisis. In an effort to prevent suits, these companies are pushing the novel legal theory that federal common law provides a basis for jurisdiction in federal court over these claims. Once in federal court, the defendants argue that the very federal common law that served as the basis for removal has been displaced by the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. This would then justify dismissal of the entire case for failure to state a claim. Luckily for the plaintiffs, nearly all the Courts of Appeals have rejected this theory, finding that removal on federal common law grounds is improper and remanding to state courts. But herein lies the problem. On remand, nothing stops the state courts from adopting the defendants’ theory. Essentially, the defendants are permitted to relitigate their preemption argument after a federal court holds that federal law does not apply.

This Note argues for the adoption of a new rule of preclusion that would apply in these cases. Where a federal court determines that federal law does not cover the claims, that judgment should have issue preclusive effect in a subsequent state court proceeding on an ordinary preemption defense. This is because a finding of no jurisdiction by a federal court necessarily entails a finding that federal law does not cover, and thus preempt, the state law claims. This rule would serve to simultaneously preserve the balance of federalism, keeping state claims in state courts and allowing only federal claims in federal courts, as well as preventing dismissals on inconsistent judgments. This rule would also preserve a fundamental notion of justice in the American legal system; it would allow the climate tort plaintiffs to finally have their day in court.

In an era dominated by efficiency-driven technology, algorithms have seamlessly integrated into every facet of daily life, wielding significant influence over decisions that impact individuals and society at large. Algorithms are deliberately portrayed as impartial and automated in order to maintain their legitimacy. However, this illusion crumbles under scrutiny, revealing the inherent biases and discriminatory tendencies embedded in ostensibly unbiased algorithms. This Note delves into the pervasive issues of discriminatory algorithms, focusing on three key areas of life opportunities: housing, employment, and voting rights. This Note systematically addresses the multifaceted issues arising from discriminatory algorithms, showcasing real-world instances of algorithmic abuse, and proposing comprehensive solutions to enhance transparency and promote fairness and justice.

Every state has a statute that requires out-of-state corporations to register with a designated official before doing business there, but courts disagree on what impact, if any, those statutes can or should have on personal jurisdiction doctrine. A minority of states interpret compliance with their registration statutes as the company’s consent to general personal jurisdiction, meaning it can be sued on any cause of action there, even those unrelated to the company’s conduct in that state. The United States Supreme Court upheld this “consent by registration” theory over 100 years ago, but since then has manifested a sea change in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence that leaves its continued viability in limbo. Two decisions by the Court from the 2010s—Goodyear Dunlop Tire Operations, S.A. v. Brown and Daimler AG v. Bauman—drastically contracted the scope of contacts-based general jurisdiction but did not appear to address the contours of consent jurisdiction. The palpable discord makes it high time for the issue to reach the Supreme Court, as it has in the high courts of four states in 2021 alone.

So, the question remains: what is left of consent by registration? Many courts and scholars have rejected the theory, reasoning that a corporation cannot give valid, knowing consent to general jurisdiction by simply complying with a state business registration statute. This Note sets out to address these concerns; it suggests that, under certain legal frameworks—where either explicit statutory language or controlling decisional law makes clear to corporations the jurisdictional consequences of registration—corporations can indeed give valid, informed consent to general jurisdiction by registering to do business in the state.