Policing Black bodies serves at the forefront of the American policing system. Black bodies are subject to everlasting surveillance through institutions and everyday occurrences. From relaxing in a Starbucks to exercising, Black bodies are deemed criminals, surveilled, profiled, and subjected to perpetual implicit bias when participating in mundane activities. Black people should have the same protections as white people and should possess the ability to engage in everyday, commonplace, and routine activities.

The Fourth Amendment was not drafted with the intention of protecting Black bodies. In fact, Black bodies were considered three-fifths of a person at the drafting of the United States Constitution during the Constitutional Convention in 1787. During the period of Reconstruction in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified to remedy racial injustices and to provide Black people with equal protection under the law.

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause selectively incorporates basic freedoms and rights outlined in the Bill of Rights is nearly incomprehensible. For example, the Supreme Court, in a piecemeal fashion, has found that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should be construed to require police and the judiciary to acknowledge and respect basic rights found in the amendments, such as the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. Yet, for over fifty years after the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court refused to acknowledge that the Due Process Clause was designed to protect the rights of individuals against the state.

The Black Fourth Amendment will repair and remedy the discriminatory policing of Black bodies. The Black Fourth Amendment will repair and remedy the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by creating a rebuttable presumption, making prosecutors and the state prove that the officer had an actual reasonable suspicion or probable cause basis to arrest a Black person, instead of mere subjective ideas and preconceived notions. Through this measure, the Black Fourth Amendment will carry out what the Fourteenth Amendment’s enigmatic Due Process Clause was intended to do—to incorporate substantive due process rights, such as those rights outlined in the Fourth Amendment, and to guarantee equal protection to Black people through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

The proliferation of marijuana legalization has changed the relationship between driving and marijuana use. While impaired driving remains illegal, marijuana use that does not result in impairment is not a bar to operating a motor vehicle. Scientists have yet to find a reliable way for law enforcement officers to make this distinction. In the marijuana impairment context, there is not a scientifically proven equivalent to the Blood Alcohol Content standard nor are there reliable roadside assessments. This scientific and technological void has problematic consequences for marijuana users that get behind the wheel and find themselves suspected of impaired driving. Without a marijuana breathalyzer or reliable Field Sobriety Tests, law enforcement officers are forced to find another way to determine impairment. Searching the vehicle for evidence of recent marijuana use can be an attractive option. However, the Fourth Amendment prohibits “search first, find probable cause later” policing. A roadside vehicle search violates a driver’s Fourth Amendment rights if sufficient evidence of impairment is lacking. Until law enforcement can reliably determine marijuana impairment at the roadside, drivers need protection from these unconstitutional searches. This Note addresses how states can disincentivize potential Fourth Amendment violations.

To provide context for this discussion, this Note begins by outlining the history of marijuana’s legal status and summarizing the relevant Fourth Amendment case law. Next, it contrasts the challenges of determining marijuana impairment with the relative ease of testing for alcohol impairment during motor vehicle stops. This Note then presents case studies of three states that each have a distinct legal approach to determining marijuana impairment amongst drivers. Finally, this Note provides prescriptive recommendations for states that have legalized or plan to legalize marijuana. Ultimately, this Note provides the reader with a primer on an important legal issue: how the inability to reliably establish marijuana impairment during a traffic stop creates an incentive for the police to search the vehicle first and find probable cause later.

In 2018, a Texas District Court shocked the nation by declaring the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) unconstitutional pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The decision was overturned by the Fifth Circuit but may well be appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The ICWA provides a framework for the removal and placement of Indian children into foster and adoptive homes in such a way that attempts to reflect the unique values of Indian culture and supports the autonomy of the tribe. In doing so, the law treats Indian children differently than it would White children. But does this divergent treatment constitute impermissible racial discrimination? Should the ICWA’s protections be applied to children merely eligible for tribal membership? What level of scrutiny should courts use when analyzing the ICWA’s constitutionality? This Note will provide insight into these questions which the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet addressed.

This Note provides a background of the ICWA and examines the current constitutional controversy in the Fifth Circuit by placing the ICWA in the larger statutory context of federal Indian jurisprudence. This Note analyzes the fundamental question raised in Indian law equal protection cases—whether the term “Indian” should be interpreted as a racial or political classification. An examination of precedent confirms the unique status of Indians as non-racial, semi-autonomous actors who often receive uncommon treatment. With this context in mind, this Note explores past equal protection challenges to the ICWA and lays out the current case. This Note recommends that the Supreme Court uphold the Fifth Circuit’s finding of constitutionality on the equal protection claim and provides two possible analytical paths to reach that conclusion. The first ascribes to the common argument that “Indian” should be viewed as a political classification, subject to reduced scrutiny. The second, however, questions the assumption that the application of strict scrutiny is fatal to the ICWA, instead proposing an alternative path forward drawing from Supreme Court reasoning in affirmative action cases. This Note concludes that future challenges to the ICWA should be struck down as the ICWA passes all levels of constitutional scrutiny.

Over twenty years ago, in Leicester v. Warner Bros., the Ninth Circuit limited copyright protection for a certain sculptural complex located within a downtown Los Angeles high‑rise. The court determined that the sculpture, otherwise protected from pictorial reproduction, could be visually replicated without infringing on the artist’s copyright because it was part of its architectural context.

This Note explores two recent copyright cases where companies capitalized on painted street art, using the works as backdrops for social media advertising. The resulting litigation calls into question Leicester’s holding and the extent to which it may allow visual reproduction of non-sculptural works incorporated into architecture. This Note’s introduction addresses the rise of legal disputes in the street art community and the circumstances of these recent cases. Part II addresses fundamentals of domestic copyright law and the varied protection for certain forms of authorship. Part III discusses an important exception for the visual reproduction of architectural works and judicial application of the exception to disputes involving painted street art. Part IV argues that Leicester should not serve as the legal standard for all such controversies, and Part V articulates a clarified inquiry to limit judicial dependency on Leicester.

This Note explores recent state efforts to reshape their respective Medicaid programs through Section 1115 waivers. Specifically, this Note looks at states that wish to convert their Medicaid program to a block grant through Section 1115 waivers. Examining the lawfulness of these waivers requires analyzing the language and application of both the Medicaid Act and the Administrative Procedure Act. This Note argues that any use of Section 1115 waivers to implement a block grant program would be a violation of the Medicaid Act and thus unlawful. Further, federal approval of such programs would be deemed arbitrary and capricious. To justify this conclusion, this Note considers three recent federal court decisions striking down states’ use of Section 1115 waivers to enforce Medicaid work requirements. This Note determines that any use of Section 1115 waivers to create a block grant program would face similar legal challenges as the work requirements cases.