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Washington and Lee Law Review - Online Edition

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Stitch Incoming: Lindke v. Freed’s Impact on Social-Media-Blocking Litigation

by Clare R. Norins & Mark L. Bailey

Since at least 2016, social-media-blocking litigation against government officials who censor their online critics has been an evolving battleground for First Amendment rights of free speech and petition. In 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its first substantive opinion on social media blocking, holding that government officials’ social media activity, even on a personal account, constitutes state action triggering constitutional scrutiny if (1) the official possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when she spoke on social media.

In this Article, we explain the Court’s novel two-part test for determining when a public official engages in state action on social media sufficient to support a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lindke v. Freed clearly (and correctly) establishes that public officials can act in their official capacity when operating a personal social media account. The Court’s default presumption in the second prong of the test, however, improperly allocates the burden of proof to private citizens in close cases to prove whether the government official subjectively intended her social media speech to be personal or official. As we show, this part of the decision is out of step with the Court’s state-action precedent and will lead to unacceptable chill and restraint of protected speech. We therefore introduce a revised standard—an objective “reasonable viewer” approach—that is more in line with long-standing First Amendment principles, which we urge the Court to adopt in future cases.

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Note

New, Derivative: Third-Party Litigation Finance and Derivatives Regulation

by Martin Flores

Litigation finance is globally abundant and largely unregulated in the United States. The mechanics behind third-party litigation finance are simple: The funder fronts litigation costs in exchange for a promised share of the proceeds if the litigant succeeds. While the normative debate about the value of these contracts in society endures, the litigation finance industry has new players in hedge funds and other opaque investment firms seeking high returns from risky litigation. Many scholars agree on whether to regulate these third-party litigation finance firms. The key debate rages on how to rein in an unbridled industry.

To add to this debate, this Note theorizes a standard third-party litigation finance contract as a derivative contract—a financial instrument that derives value from the performance of an underlying asset. This novel approach examines the structure and features of third-party litigation finance arrangements, particularly in commercial and mass-tort contexts, and argues for their classification as derivatives within the regulatory framework of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”).

By framing litigation finance contracts as derivatives, this Note proposes a regulatory solution that leverages existing financial structures rather than creating new oversight bodies or legislation. Rather than envisioning a new oversight body or legislation for this type of finance, this Note advocates that the United States leverage its existing financial structures to guide this escalating industry forward while maintaining market integrity. It is high time for regulation of the third-party litigation finance (“TPLF”) industry, and this Note provides a potential solution to a growing regulatory conundrum: using existing tools of financial regulation to address a new problem.

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Note

Generative Artificial Intelligence and Copyright in the Film and Media Industry

by Victor A. Oberting IV

The development of generative artificial intelligence (“GAI” or “generative AI”) introduces compelling benefits and capabilities to filmmakers and artists, but also brings complications regarding copyright of creative works. The American film and media industry in particular illustrates the scope of GAI’s legal, economic, and ethical implications. Though GAI may exhibit characteristics of independent agency or intent, GAI models are best understood as a new set of tools that serve a diverse range of applications in the creative process. The potential benefits of this set of tools can only be realized, then, if the filmmakers who use them are not unreasonably denied the authorship and ownership rights necessary to capitalize on their works. Copyright law can fulfill its utilitarian purpose in the context of the film industry with a balance of practical authorship requirements and dynamic licensing regimes for AI-assisted works. Through the right combination of legislation, policy, and best practices, copyright law can further facilitate the effective implementation of GAI in film and media while also recognizing its relevant challenges and risks.

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A Jacksonian Theory of Estoppel in IP Litigation Against the United States

by Leonard C. Brahin

As an intellectual property infringer, the federal government occupies a unique position as both the entity that approved the infringed patent or trademark and an entity capable of arguing for its invalidity. By arguing for invalidity, the federal government assumes that it should be exempt from the traditional rules of procedural estoppel. Indeed, the government believes that even though it granted intellectual property rights (after careful research and deliberation and following the express review of an officer appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate), it should have a second bite at the apple to invalidate a patent or trademark when it risks liability. Ultimately, permitting the government to argue for inconsistent positions risks making intellectual property litigation—and the government itself—unpredictable and untrustworthy. To remedy this imbalance, this Article advocates for a rethinking of estoppel through Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Sheet concurrence when an examining attorney acts pursuant to unambiguous authority granted by Congress. In doing so, this position equalizes the playing field during litigation that heavily favors the federal government.

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Note

The Fiduciary Duty of Combatting Global Climate Change

by Sadie Mapstone

Ancient Roman Law codified the concept that there are certain resources that are so great and so important to human survival, that intuitively, no person should own them. Further, the government must protect these resources for the people. Today, this concept is known at the public trust doctrine. According to the contemporary doctrine, the seas, oceans, shores, and submerged lands cannot be privately owned, but shall be held in trust by the government for public use. Relying on the public trust doctrine, climate change litigants have brought a tirade of lawsuits—which have largely been unsuccessful—alleging that the government has a fiduciary duty to protect trust resources, and thus must take steps to mitigate the effects of climate change. Despite the backdrop of the current climate crisis, courts have declined to impose such an affirmative duty on the government.

This Note analyzes the viability of the public trust doctrine as a litigation tool to combat global climate change. It examines the doctrine’s history and purpose dating back to ancient Roman Law. Further, this Note advocates for an expansion of the doctrine and for the establishment of an affirmative fiduciary duty on the government to protect the resources held in trust. Ultimately, it offers a solution to give the doctrine the necessary teeth to enact meaningful environmental change.

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Unfenced: The Fourth Circuit Gives Geofencing Its First Appellate Go-Ahead in United States v. Chatrie

by Jordan Wallace-Wolf

In United States v. Chatrie, the Fourth Circuit issued the first federal appellate opinion on the Fourth Amendment status of geofencing queries. The opinion is significant because geofences present a conceptual challenge to the framework of Carpenter v. United States, the reigning Supreme Court precedent on the Fourth Amendment status of digital searches. That opinion held that long-term tracking of a target individual was a search. However, geofencing reveals information about an indeterminate number of individuals for only a short time, in virtue of their being at a target location during a target span of time. Does the reasoning for the former holding in Carpenter entail that the latter is a search, too? I argue that the answer is no, unless Carpenter is given an ambitious interpretation. The court in Chatrie refused to go that far, and so held that the geofence at issue was not a search. I do not celebrate this result. Instead, I think it illustrates the limitations of Carpenter, doctrinally speaking, and the need to confront those limitations with eyes open.

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Note

Implied Consent in Administrative Adjudication

by Grace Moore

Article III of the Constitution mandates that judges exercising the federal judicial power receive life tenure and that their pay not be diminished. Nonetheless, certain forms of adjudication have always taken place outside of Article III—in state courts, military tribunals, territorial courts, and administrative tribunals. Administrative law judges, employed by various federal administrative agencies, decide thousands of cases each year. A vast majority of the cases they decide deal with public rights, which generally include claims involving federal statutory rights or cases in which the federal government is a party. With litigant consent, however, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative adjudication of certain claims involving private rights. In the bankruptcy context, the Court has further determined that litigant consent may be implied.

This Note considers implied consent in the context of administrative adjudication. It examines various objections to it and argues that allowing parties to implicitly consent to administrative adjudication of claims involving private rights does not violate Article III. This Note offers a solution for how the consent exception to Article III should operate in the context of administrative adjudication by considering what constitutes implied consent and the weight of litigant consent in the determination of whether a claim involving private rights is proper for administrative adjudication.

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ESG, Sustainability Disclosure, and Institutional Investor Stewardship

by Giovanni Strampelli

This Article sheds new light on the link between sustainability disclosure and institutional investors’ stewardship activities aimed at promoting improvements in the ESG performance of investee companies. On the one hand, sustainability disclosure is one of the information elements that may be relevant to institutional investors’ stewardship activities. On the other hand, improving the quality of sustainability reports provided by investee companies is often the ultimate goal of investor engagement initiatives. The role of climate and social disclosure is problematic from both perspectives. First, institutional investors, especially those with broadly diversified portfolios, are unable to use sustainability information directly and rely on ESG ratings and indices for their investment and stewardship strategies due to the very high costs involved. Therefore, in addition to the fact that the regulatory framework still appears to be fragmented and that there are differences between different sets of sustainability disclosures, European legislation shows that it is not enough to provide for climate and social disclosure requirements and that regulation of ESG ratings and indices is essential to make them more transparent and reliable. Second, the decision by non‑activist institutional investors to focus part of their engagement initiatives on sustainability disclosure, for example by requiring a higher degree of transparency or the adoption of a particular reporting framework, appears to be dictated by a desire to avoid more intrusive (and perceived as more aggressive) initiatives aimed directly at encouraging changes in the environmental strategies or policies of the companies concerned.

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Note

Addressing Mental Disability Head On: The Challenges of Reasonable Accommodation Requests for Virginia Housing Providers

by Haley Fortner

A person’s home should be a sanctuary of safety, security, and comfortability away from the demands of the outside world. Yet for many people living with mental illness, a home can all too easily become a sort of temporary prison. Nowhere is this more apparent than when a housing provider stands in the way of allowing someone with a mental disability the equal opportunity to use and enjoy their home. Fair housing law’s reasonable accommodation requirement works to ensure those living with mental illness receive the accommodations they need in order to live safely and comfortably in their own home. Even the most well-intentioned housing providers, however, continue to find themselves in violation of fair housing law as they struggle to decipher when and how they should grant requests for reasonable accommodation.

This Note provides a comprehensive overview of fair housing law both federally and in Virginia with a particular focus on the reasonable accommodation requirement in the context of mental disabilities. This Note not only seeks to explain why the reasonable accommodation requirement is tricky for many housing providers when the requested accommodation is made on the basis of a mental disability but also seeks to inform housing providers on how to navigate the requirement’s challenges and offer potential solutions that could help alleviate those challenges in the future.

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Development

“No Superior But God”: History, Post Presidential Immunity, and the Intent of the Framers

by Trace M. Maddox

This essay is directly responsive to one of the most pressing issues currently before the courts of the United States: the question of whether former Presidents enjoy immunity from criminal prosecution for acts they committed in office. Building upon the recent ruling of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Trump, 91 F.4th 1173 (D.C. Cir. 2024) this essay argues that the clear answer to that question is a resounding “no”.

Former President Trump, who has now appealed the D.C. Circuit’s ruling to the Supreme Court, contends that post-presidential criminal immunity is implicit in the Constitution of the United States. Embracing the principle that the Constitution “cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institutions as they were when the instrument was framed”, Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108–109 (1925), this essay analyzes that claim in the light of the pre-revolutionary common law and the writings of the Framers and their contemporaries. Drawing from these sources, this essay demonstrates that the Constitution reflects a clear intent on the part of its Framers to cleanly break with the historic tradition of the sacred and inviolable executive. On these bases, this essay concludes that a doctrine of post-presidential immunity from criminal prosecution is not merely—as the Court of Appeals properly held—unsupported by positive law, but, moreover, both contrary to the Framers’ intent and fundamentally incompatible with the Constitution of the United States. It therefore urges the Supreme Court, when deciding the issue for the final time, to consider the thousand-year-old history underlying Mr. Trump’s claims to immunity and to reject those claims as incompatible with the republican government established by this country’s founders.

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