This Essay argues that it’s perfectly fine for religious citizens to openly bring their faith-based values to public policy disputes. Part II demonstrates that the Founders, exemplified by Thomas Jefferson, never intended to separate religion from politics. Part III, focusing upon Abraham Lincoln’s opposition to slavery, shows that religion and politics have been continuously intermixed ever since the Founding. Part IV, emphasizing the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., argues that no other reasons justify barring faith-based arguments from the public square.
Washington and Lee Law Review - Church & State
Roundtable
by Ian Huyett
This Essay responds to comments by Samuel Calhoun, Wayne Barnes, and David Smolin, made as part of a roundtable discussion on Calhoun’s symposium address Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to Separate Religion from Politics. In Part I, I discuss current events, especially as they pertain to Smolin’s comments. In Part II, I answer Calhoun’s challenges to my own response. In Part III, I criticize Barnes’s response, which was diametrically different from my own. In Part IV, I draw on Smolin’s observations to discuss the path forward for Christians in the current climate.
Roundtable
by Wayne R. Barnes
This symposium has revolved around Professor Calhoun’s article, which posits that it is completely legitimate, in proposing laws and public policies, to argue for them in the public square based on overtly religious principles. In my initial response, I took issue with his argument that no reasons justify barring faith-based arguments from the public square argument. In fact, I do find reasons justifying the prohibition of “faith-based,” or Christian, arguments in the public square—and, in fact, I find such reasons within Christianity itself. This is because what is being publicly communicated in Christian political argumentation is that if citizens comply with certain laws being proposed (i.e., they behave in the legally-argued way), it will cohere with Christian principles, and thereby gain them favor with God. Or, more simply, “if I do these things, it will please God.” This “works-based” favor with God is a completely incorrect view of orthodox Christian doctrine, which subscribes to salvation by faith alone. Christian-based political argumentation runs counter to the Christian gospel, because it gets itself tangled up into law, or works, as something that can be done in order to gain greater favor with God. It is, in fact, at odds with the Gospel. Professor Calhoun, in his reply to my article, has availed himself of this opportunity to demonstrate why his views on overt Christian political advocacy have changed since first holding a position similarly to mine over twenty-five years ago, and that he now believes Christian theology poses no problem to the advocacy he promotes. His first argument is that such advocacy will be seen not as promising eternal favor with God, but merely the staving off of immediate calamity or judgment from God in this life; I question whether this is how such advocacy will be perceived, but caution that this message, too, is quite probably wrong, as well. His second argument is that laws make man conscious of sin and can indeed bring one to faith in God; I point out that the scriptures on consciousness of sin are referencing the Mosaic law handed down directly by God through Moses, not secular laws passed by secular states. His third argument is that God actually decrees good works or behavior by Christians as part of a missional plan to reach unbelievers for the faith; however, I point out that what is sought from the unbelievers is not the replication of the observed works (as is the case with decreed secular law), but rather an encouragement to come to genuine faith in God. I conclude by remaining convinced that overt Christian political argumentation, in Christian terms, is more harmful than beneficial.
Roundtable
by Samuel W. Calhoun
This Essay responds to comments by Wayne Barnes, Ian Huyett, and David Smolin on my prior Article, Separation of Church and State: Jefferson, Lincoln, and the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Show It Was Never Intended to Separate Religion from Politics. Part II, although noting a few disagreements with Huyett and Smolin, principally argues that they strengthen the case for the appropriateness of religious arguments in the public square. Part III evaluates Wayne Barnes’s contention that Christian doctrine requires separating religion from politics.
Roundtable
by Ian Huyett
In his address, Professor Calhoun used American Christian abolitionism to illustrate the beneficial role that religion can play in political debate. Surveying the past two millennia, I argue that Christian political thought has protected liberty in every era of the church’s dramatic history. Along the way, I rebut critics—from the left and right—who urge that Christianity’s political influence has been unhelpful or harmful. I also seek to show that statements like “religion has no place in politics” are best understood as expressions of arbitrary bias.
Roundtable
by David M. Smolin
Political and philosophical theorists have often advocated for the exclusion of some or all religious perspectives from full participation in politics. Such approaches create criteria—such as public accessibility, public reason, or secular rationale—to legitimate such exclusion. During the 1990s I argued, as an evangelical Christian, against such exclusionary theories, defending the rights to full and equal political participation by evangelical Christians, traditionalist Roman Catholics, and any others who would be restricted by such criteria.
Roundtable
by Wayne R. Barnes
Professor Calhoun, in his Article around which this symposium is based, has asserted that it is permissible for citizens to publicly argue for laws or public policy solutions based on explicitly religious reasons. Calhoun candidly admits that he has “long grappled” with this question (as have I, though he for longer), and, in probably the biggest understatement in this entire symposium, notes that Professor Kent Greenawalt identified this as “a particularly significant, debatable, and highly complex problem.” Is it ever. I have a position that I will advance in this article, but I wish to acknowledge at the outset that this is a difficult and complicated issue. It intersects with issues of constitutional law, theology, political theory, jurisprudence, philosophy, law and morality—and that’s just off the top of my head. As soon as one issue is addressed, twelve others raise their head and confound. I am also mindful that Professor Calhoun has been grappling with this issue for far longer than I have. I respect him and his thoughtful treatment of this issue immensely. Part of my trepidation in addressing this subject is that, as will be seen in this response, Professor Calhoun once held a very similar opinion on this issue as me. However, he has evolved beyond it, whereas I (to date) have not. The structure of this online symposium is that Professor Calhoun will have a chance to respond in writing to the points I make in this Article, and I will then have the opportunity to reflect and respond to his reply. I look forward to the exchange, and I know that I will be enriched for having participated in the dialogue.
