Article III of the Constitution mandates that judges exercising the federal judicial power receive life tenure and that their pay not be diminished. Nonetheless, certain forms of adjudication have always taken place outside of Article III—in state courts, military tribunals, territorial courts, and administrative tribunals. Administrative law judges, employed by various federal administrative agencies, decide thousands of cases each year. A vast majority of the cases they decide deal with public rights, which generally include claims involving federal statutory rights or cases in which the federal government is a party. With litigant consent, however, the Supreme Court has upheld administrative adjudication of certain claims involving private rights. In the bankruptcy context, the Court has further determined that litigant consent may be implied.

This Note considers implied consent in the context of administrative adjudication. It examines various objections to it and argues that allowing parties to implicitly consent to administrative adjudication of claims involving private rights does not violate Article III. This Note offers a solution for how the consent exception to Article III should operate in the context of administrative adjudication by considering what constitutes implied consent and the weight of litigant consent in the determination of whether a claim involving private rights is proper for administrative adjudication.

A person’s home should be a sanctuary of safety, security, and comfortability away from the demands of the outside world. Yet for many people living with mental illness, a home can all too easily become a sort of temporary prison. Nowhere is this more apparent than when a housing provider stands in the way of allowing someone with a mental disability the equal opportunity to use and enjoy their home. Fair housing law’s reasonable accommodation requirement works to ensure those living with mental illness receive the accommodations they need in order to live safely and comfortably in their own home. Even the most well-intentioned housing providers, however, continue to find themselves in violation of fair housing law as they struggle to decipher when and how they should grant requests for reasonable accommodation.

This Note provides a comprehensive overview of fair housing law both federally and in Virginia with a particular focus on the reasonable accommodation requirement in the context of mental disabilities. This Note not only seeks to explain why the reasonable accommodation requirement is tricky for many housing providers when the requested accommodation is made on the basis of a mental disability but also seeks to inform housing providers on how to navigate the requirement’s challenges and offer potential solutions that could help alleviate those challenges in the future.

Since the 1950’s, scientists have built novel technologies to screen for genetic diseases and other biological irregularities. Recently, researchers have developed a method called “liquid biopsy” (as opposed to a standard tissue biopsy) that uses a liquid sample (e.g., blood) to non‑invasively spot biomarkers indicating different types of cancers in the patient’s body. While the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has fully cleared a small number of liquid biopsy tests under its rigorous and expensive review process, most biotech companies have instead followed a less restrictive regulatory path through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), which label the devices as “laboratory-developed tests” (LDTs).

Despite Congress’ initial passage of LDT designation in the 1980’s, LDT regulation remains akin to the “Wild West,” with ongoing questions about which agency is actually in charge of LDTs. While FDA initially claimed regulatory control over LDTs, it has (until recently) left discretion to CMS. Therefore, some unscrupulous companies have tried to abuse the gray regulatory area by marketing potentially misleading scientific claims about their LDTs, comparing them to FDA‑approved tests. Competitors with fully‑approved tests are furious and have sued under federal Lanham Act claims. Because of Congress’ repeated failures to pass a law addressing these claims and modernize the regulatory path for all in-vitro diagnostic tests, the FDA has proposed its own rules amending its regulatory authority to reign in most diagnostic tests.

This Note therefore suggests a multi-faceted approach to address the issue of regulating LDTs and their potentially misleading claims by (1) revising failed Congressional bills to allow regulatory and industry compromise, (2) applying certain circuit court decisions on Lanham Act claims to questionable facts in a company’s advertisements, and (3) narrowly expand the FDA’s regulatory power to all liquid biopsy tests before gradually expanding to all LDTs. Although LDTs may benefit the healthcare sector by offering novel tools to identify rare diseases, the federal government must develop an approach that both protects private parties and the general public and balances the need for research and development of life‑saving diagnostic tests.

Across the United States, a countless number of people rely on groundwater for basic necessities such as eating, drinking, agriculture, and energy-creation. At the same time, overuse combined with increasingly dry conditions throughout the country, tied to the increasingly unpredictable and devastating impacts of climate change, threaten this fundamental building block of society. Nowhere is this problem more pernicious than the American Southwest. The Colorado River Basin has always been the epicenter of water disputes between communities and states. Bad policies, unhelpful federal actions, and sluggish Supreme Court decisions stop the painful but necessary steps to address the increasingly dire water shortage. At the center of this crisis are two opposing camps that stand to gain or lose much. California, with the weight of history is on one side, while Arizona and Nevada, often disadvantaged, occupy the other. Yet these underdog states may have a way to escape the unjust outcomes that have hounded them to this point. If Arizona and Nevada choose, recent Supreme Court decisions provide the ammunition needed to finally create a fair and equitable distribution of water in the Southwest, and break California’s oppressive control over the lion’s share of Colorado River Basin water.

Municipalities have been trying for decades to hold energy companies accountable for their role in the climate change crisis. In an effort to prevent suits, these companies are pushing the novel legal theory that federal common law provides a basis for jurisdiction in federal court over these claims. Once in federal court, the defendants argue that the very federal common law that served as the basis for removal has been displaced by the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. This would then justify dismissal of the entire case for failure to state a claim. Luckily for the plaintiffs, nearly all the Courts of Appeals have rejected this theory, finding that removal on federal common law grounds is improper and remanding to state courts. But herein lies the problem. On remand, nothing stops the state courts from adopting the defendants’ theory. Essentially, the defendants are permitted to relitigate their preemption argument after a federal court holds that federal law does not apply.

This Note argues for the adoption of a new rule of preclusion that would apply in these cases. Where a federal court determines that federal law does not cover the claims, that judgment should have issue preclusive effect in a subsequent state court proceeding on an ordinary preemption defense. This is because a finding of no jurisdiction by a federal court necessarily entails a finding that federal law does not cover, and thus preempt, the state law claims. This rule would serve to simultaneously preserve the balance of federalism, keeping state claims in state courts and allowing only federal claims in federal courts, as well as preventing dismissals on inconsistent judgments. This rule would also preserve a fundamental notion of justice in the American legal system; it would allow the climate tort plaintiffs to finally have their day in court.

In an era dominated by efficiency-driven technology, algorithms have seamlessly integrated into every facet of daily life, wielding significant influence over decisions that impact individuals and society at large. Algorithms are deliberately portrayed as impartial and automated in order to maintain their legitimacy. However, this illusion crumbles under scrutiny, revealing the inherent biases and discriminatory tendencies embedded in ostensibly unbiased algorithms. This Note delves into the pervasive issues of discriminatory algorithms, focusing on three key areas of life opportunities: housing, employment, and voting rights. This Note systematically addresses the multifaceted issues arising from discriminatory algorithms, showcasing real-world instances of algorithmic abuse, and proposing comprehensive solutions to enhance transparency and promote fairness and justice.