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Washington and Lee Law Review - Volume 76:3

Note

by Mary Kate Nicholson

The United States was founded in part on the principle of freedom of religion, where citizens were free to practice any religion. The founding fathers felt so strongly about this principle that it was incorporated into the First Amendment. The Free Exercise Clause states that “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” The Supreme Court later adopted the neutral principles approach to avoid Free Exercise violations resulting from courts deciding real property disputes. Without the application of the same neutral principles to intellectual property disputes between churches, however, there is real danger of violating the Free Exercise Clause. This Note seeks to answer the question: Does the government’s role in approving and enforcing trademark rights in intra-church disputes violate the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment?

Part II of this Note provides an overview of Supreme Court church property jurisprudence and describes the evolution of the neutral principles approach. This Note primarily focuses on property disputes between hierarchical churches, as their governing structure leaves them most vulnerable to Free Exercise implications. Part III outlines how an entity, secular or religious, registers a trademark with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). The section details infringement actions and provides examples of registered church trademarks. Part IV concerns the constitutional implications of church trademark adjudication, specifically through the lens of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Part IV.A concludes that the USPTO’s registering of church trademarks does not violate the Establishment Clause. Part IV.B analyzes Free Exercise implications concerning the adjudication of trademark infringement suits. Because of the neutral principles approach and the inherently ecclesiastical nature of church trademarks, Part IV.B concludes that current court action violates the Free Exercise Clause. Part V suggests that courts should uniformly apply the neutral principles approach to real and intellectual property disputes alike. This section theorizes that such an approach would prevent future Free Exercise violations.

Note

by Natalia Homchick

Imagine you have decided to run for office, to speak out publicly against an injustice, to enter the job market, or even to join a new online forum. Now, imagine after starting your chosen endeavor, you go online to discover that someone who disagrees with your position posted your personal information on the internet and called for others to harass you. To make matters worse, you realize that you cannot determine who posted your personal data. You have been doxed. Because you cannot identify the person who posted your information, where can you turn for recourse? The next logical party is the website where your personal information was posted. Unfortunately, under current laws online intermediaries are typically immunized from liability in these situations. This Note argues that this lack of legal recourse is no longer acceptable in the internet-dominated modern world.

Despite growing awareness of doxing’s pernicious consequences, existing laws do not adequately address either the underlying behavior or its consequences. Some signs of progress, however, are emerging. Proposed legislation in the U.S. House of Representatives — the Online Safety Modernization Act of 2017 (Online Safety Act) — would provide for federal criminal and civil liability for doxing. This bill is a step forward, but it does not address the lack of legal recourse for a victim if the person posting the information cannot be identified. This Note aims to explain why it is appropriate, and necessary, to hold online intermediaries secondarily liable when the doxer cannot be identified.

Article

by Omari Scott Simmons

Shareholder activism—using an equity stake in a corporation to influence management—has become a popular tool to effectuate social change in the twenty-first century. Increasingly, activists are looking beyond financial performance to demand better corporate performance in such areas as economic inequality, civil rights, human rights, discrimination, and diversity. These efforts take many forms: publicity campaigns, litigation, proxy battles, shareholder resolutions, and negotiations with corporate management. However, a consensus on scope is lacking. Should corporations change their own operations to reflect a specific agenda or use their power to influence society on a much broader scale? Distinctions between private and public become blurred in light of the ubiquitous and inevitable influence corporations wield over third parties. Theoretical absolutes on the individualist-communitarian spectrum may underestimate the complex co-dependent and co-responsible interrelationship between corporations and modern society. Critics may fairly question why corporations, arguably society’s most potent institutions, should sit idle on problems like civil rights.

This essay offers a historical account of a seminal civil rights decision, Belton v. Gebhart, in the Delaware Court of Chancery. The circumstances surrounding the Belton case illuminate the limits and potential of shareholder activism to bolster civil rights in the modern context. Examining a historical civil rights example is instructive for thinking about how shareholder activism might advance the modern civil rights agenda.

Part II of this essay examines Belton v. Gebhart in its contemporary context. Part III examines the key differences between past and present civil rights-related shareholder activism. Part IV concludes that Belton v. Gebhart, along with its surrounding circumstances and events, vividly illustrates that advancing civil rights requires a range of tactics that leverage public, private, and philanthropic resources. Shareholder activism works best as part of a multipronged activist strategy, not as a substitute for other types of activism. Recognizing the complex challenges associated with advancing civil rights, this essay raises key questions about the nascent environmental, social, and governance (ESG) framework with which scholars, practitioners, and other observers must contend.

This article builds upon the author’s remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Article

by Virginia Harper Ho

In 2017, shareholder proposals urging corporate boards to report on their climate-related risk made headlines when they earned majority support from investors at ExxonMobil, Occidental Petroleum, and PPL. The key to this historic vote was the support of Blackrock, State Street, and Vanguard, which broke with management and cast their votes behind the proposals. The 2018 proxy season saw several more climate-related proposals earn majority support, and in 2018 and 2019 record numbers of proposals were withdrawn after the companies agreed to respond to shareholders’ requests.

The highly visible 2017 proposal illustrates a number of key aspects of shareholder activism today. The first is the mainstreaming of shareholder activism from its origins in the civil rights and socially responsible investment movements to a point where the largest institutional investors are integrating “environmental, social, and governance” (ESG) or “non-financial” factors into their voting and investment policies. Second, the proposal shows how the focus of shareholder activism around ESG matters has broadened beyond the civil rights, labor, and human rights issues that were its major target throughout much of the twentieth century. Climate change risk and corporate environmental impacts are now among the top subjects of shareholder proposals today. Third, as explained below, mainstream investors like Blackrock and Vanguard are supporting ESG-oriented activism for economic reasons, not only or even necessarily because of commitments to a particular ethical or political position. And finally, this proposal is one of many ESG proposals (about 20 percent of all environmental and social proposals in 2018) that seek greater corporate transparency about non-financial risks and impacts, either to better inform investor decision-making or to prompt changes in corporate practice.

This Article focuses on the challenge of achieving corporate transparency for investment purposes and considers whether shareholder activism is the best way to achieve it. Many in the business community appear to think so. For example, in 2016, many corporations and law firms offered comments to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on the question of whether the agency should develop new ESG-related disclosure rules. Nearly all took the position that shareholder engagement and other forms of shareholder activism were the best way to improve ESG disclosure and that the SEC should leave well enough alone.

This article builds upon the author’s remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Article

by Sarah C. Haan

What does “corporate democracy” mean? How far does federal law go to guarantee public company investors a say in a firm’s policies on important social, environmental, or political issues? In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court appeared ready to start sketching the contours of corporate democracy—and then, at the last minute, it pulled back. This Article tells the story of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, in which a national civil rights organization, best known for its work at civil rights marches and protests, fought to expand the limits of corporate democracy and nearly succeeded.

This Article proceeds in three parts. Following the introduction, Part II tells the story of how a civil rights organization advanced the cause of shareholder activism in the late 1960s. It begins with the group’s first, clumsy efforts to use shareholder tools and traces developments through the tumultuous 1970 proxy season, in which major companies’ annual meetings featured confrontations involving police, private security forces, guard dogs, and rock-throwing stockholders. Archival documents reveal that a Yale law student was the original donor of five shares of Dow Chemical Company stock to Medical Committee, and that he helped connect the civil rights organization to the prominent securities lawyers who litigated its case. An important victory came early: Dow stopped manufacturing napalm in May 1969, around the time of its annual shareholders meeting. However, Dow’s management never admitted any concession to the investor insurgency.

Part III describes the legal wrangling that took place in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court. This Part excavates primary documents from the case files of Supreme Court Justices involved in the case, including those of Justice Thurgood Marshall, who wrote the opinion that declared the controversy moot, and Justice William O. Douglas, the former New Deal SEC Chair, who departed from his longstanding practice of recusing himself from securities law cases to dissent. What these documents suggest is that, if it had been decided on the merits, SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights would have been a close case. This is especially noteworthy considering that two of the nine Justices who were members of the Court when it granted certiorari—Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan—had resigned for health reasons by the time the case was argued. In the end, Medical Committee saw its gains for corporate democracy dissolved as fierce maneuvering by Dow’s corporate management and the SEC won the upper hand.

Part IV considers the significance of SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights to history. It presents the case as civil rights history, as securities law history, and as corporate governance history, and offers some reflections on the case in light of the current debate about the right of shareholders to have a voice in a company’s manufacture or sale of controversial products.

This article builds upon the author’s remarks at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

Article

by Lisa M. Fairfax

In 1952, the SEC altered the shareholder proposal rule to exclude proposals made “primarily for the purpose of promoting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar causes.” The SEC did not reference civil rights activist James Peck or otherwise acknowledge that its actions were prompted by Peck’s 1951 shareholder proposal to Greyhound for desegregating seating. Instead, the SEC indicated that its change simply reflected a codification of a position the SEC staff had taken in 1945.

Today, the shareholder proposal rule has evolved, giving way to several amendments that now enable shareholders to submit proposals on the proxy statement that involve significant policy issues that transcend economic significance to the corporation. Nevertheless, we continue to grapple with the underlying corporate governance issues raised by Peck’s proposal. Those issues center around at least two questions: First, what constitutes proper subjects for corporate action? Second, what should be the shareholder’s role in advancing those subjects?

My talk today seeks to answer these two questions, particularly as they relate to the theme of this conference and the kind of activism engaged in by shareholders such as James Peck. Put a different way, those questions can be viewed as follows: First, can the pursuit of social justice be a proper subject of corporate action and behavior? My answer is yes. The for-profit company has proven that it can deploy resources to advance economic innovation and change. Art, music, technology, social media, the sharing economy, all of these innovations reached the public through the for-profit corporation. Why not use the vast resources and power of the for-profit corporation to be the engine for social innovation and change?

This article is based on the author’s keynote address at the 2018-2019 Lara D. Gass Annual Symposium: Civil Rights and Shareholder Activism at Washington and Lee University School of Law, February 15, 2019.

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