Since at least 2016, social-media-blocking litigation against government officials who censor their online critics has been an evolving battleground for First Amendment rights of free speech and petition. In 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its first substantive opinion on social media blocking, holding that government officials’ social media activity, even on a personal account, constitutes state action triggering constitutional scrutiny if (1) the official possessed actual authority to speak on the State’s behalf, and (2) purported to exercise that authority when she spoke on social media.

In this Article, we explain the Court’s novel two-part test for determining when a public official engages in state action on social media sufficient to support a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lindke v. Freed clearly (and correctly) establishes that public officials can act in their official capacity when operating a personal social media account. The Court’s default presumption in the second prong of the test, however, improperly allocates the burden of proof to private citizens in close cases to prove whether the government official subjectively intended her social media speech to be personal or official. As we show, this part of the decision is out of step with the Court’s state-action precedent and will lead to unacceptable chill and restraint of protected speech. We therefore introduce a revised standard—an objective “reasonable viewer” approach—that is more in line with long-standing First Amendment principles, which we urge the Court to adopt in future cases.